Finance

Assessing the cost of transfer inconvenience in public transport systems: A case study of the London Underground

Assessing the cost of transfer inconvenience in public transport systems: A case study of the London Underground
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Vol. 45, 2, 91-104

Guo, Zhan and Nigel H.M. Wilson
01/03/2011

Few studies have adequately assessed the cost of transfers in public transport systems, or provided useful guidance on transfer improvements, such as where to invest (which facility), how to invest (which aspect), and how much to invest (quantitative justification of the investment). This paper proposes a new method based on path choice,3 taking into account both the operator's service supply and the customers' subjective perceptions to assess transfer cost and to identify ways to reduce it. This method evaluates different transfer components (e.g., transfer walking, waiting, and penalty) with distinct policy solutions and differentiates between transfer stations and movements.

The method is applied to one of the largest and most complex public transport systems in the world, the London Underground (LUL), with a focus on 17 major transfer stations and 303 transfer movements. This study confirms that transfers pose a significant cost to LUL, and that cost is distributed unevenly across stations and across platforms at a station.

Transfer stations are perceived very differently by passengers in terms of their overall cost and composition. The case study suggests that a better understanding of transfer behavior and improvements to the transfer experience could significantly benefit public transport systems.

 

Credit is Not a Right

Credit is Not a Right

Gershman, John and Jonathan Morduch.
01/01/2011

Is credit a human right? Muhammad Yunus, the most visible leader of a global movement to provide microcredit to world’s poor, says it should be. NYU’s John Gershman and FAI’s Jonathan Morduch disagree. In their new paper, Credit is Not a Right, they ask whether a rights-based approach to microcredit will in fact be effective in making quality, affordable credit more available to poor families – and, more importantly, whether it is a constructive step in terms of the broader goal of global poverty reduction. Jonathan Morduch argues his case in this video.

Testing Competing Capital Structure Theories of Nonprofit Organizations

Testing Competing Capital Structure Theories of Nonprofit Organizations
Public Budgeting and Finance 31(3): 119-143

Calabrese, Thad,
01/01/2011

The static trade-off and pecking order capital structure theories are analyzed and applied to nonprofit organizations. In addition, this paper also considers how nonprofits adjust their leverage over time. The analyses consider the unique role of donor-restricted endowments in the decision to borrow, as well as different types of borrowing by nonprofits. The results indicate that nonprofit capital structure choices are best explained using the pecking order theory, in which internal funds are preferred over external borrowing. Further, nonprofit endowment is not found to increase leverage. Despite the unambiguous findings across varying definitions of leverage, the results also suggest that a “modified pecking order” is a more apt descriptor of nonprofit behavior.

Borrowing to Save

Borrowing to Save
Journal of Globalization and Development 102 (2), December 2010.

Jonathan Morduch
12/01/2010

Poor families often borrow even when they have savings sufficient to cover the loan. The practice is costly relative to drawing down one’s own savings, and it seems particularly puzzling in poor communities.  The families themselves explain that it is easier to repay a moneylender than to “repay” oneself, an explanation in line with recent findings in behavioral economics.  In this context, high interest rates on loans can help instill discipline.  While workable, the mechanism is hardly optimal; options could be improved through access to a contractual saving device that helps savers rebuild assets after a major withdrawal.

Microfinance Games

Microfinance Games
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2(3): 60-95, July 2010.

Gine, Xavier, Pamela Jakiela, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Morduch
07/01/2010

Microfinance banks use group-based lending contracts to strengthen borrowers' incentives for diligence, but the contracts are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion. We systematically unpack microfinance mechanisms through ten experimental games played in an experimental economics laboratory in urban Peru. Risk-taking broadly conforms to theoretical predictions, with dynamic incentives strongly reducing risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms. Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when borrowers form their own groups. Group contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse. 

A Philanthropy Tackles Growth In Health Costs At The State Level

A Philanthropy Tackles Growth In Health Costs At The State Level
Health Affairs, 29, no. 7 (2010): 1411-1414 

Sandman, D., & Kovner, A.
07/01/2010

Slowing the rate of growth of health spending is as critical a goal at the state level as it is at the national level. Philanthropy can hardly address this issue alone, yet it has an obligation to take on big and seemingly intractable problems. The New York State Health Foundation is committed to stimulating innovative and replicable approaches to bending the cost curve.

This article describes how the foundation recently awarded six grants to support efforts related to payment reform, hospital re-admissions, medical malpractice reform, palliative care, and the quantification of other cost containment approaches that could be pursued atthe state level.

The Economics of Microfinance, 2nd edition

The Economics of Microfinance, 2nd edition
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Beatriz Armendáriz and Jonathan Morduch
06/01/2010

Contents:

1 Rethinking Banking 

2 Why Intervene in Credit Markets? 

3 Roots of Microfinance: ROSCAs and Credit Cooperatives

4 Group Lending

5 Beyond Group Lending

6 Savings and Insurance

7 Gender

8 Commercialization and Regulation

9 Measuring Impacts

10 Subsidy and Sustainability

11 Managing Microfinance 

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