Governance

A Deficit Model of Collaborative Governance: Government-Nonprofit Fiscal Relations in the Provision of Child Welfare Services

A Deficit Model of Collaborative Governance: Government-Nonprofit Fiscal Relations in the Provision of Child Welfare Services
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(4): 1031-1058.

Nicole Marwell and Thad Calabrese
12/01/2015

Much existing scholarship on nonprofit organizations’ receipt of government funds appears to assume that there is something highly problematic about this relationship. Although rarely articulated in these studies, the concern about the negative effects of government funding turns on a view of nonprofits that privileges their private character. In this paper, rather than examining how public funds constrain private action, we inquire about how government deploys private organizations, via the mechanism of government funding, to secure a public good.  Using a case study of the nonprofit child welfare sector in New York State, we theorize a deficit model of collaborative governance in which nonprofits have been deputized by the state to secure children’s social rights but do not receive sufficient resources to cover the costs of securing those rights. Then, we connect this theory to organization-level financial management practices that pose challenges to the nonprofits of both survival and service quality. This nonprofit organizational instability concerns the state insofar as it threatens the securing of individuals’ social rights.

To Give Is to Get: The Promotional Role of Investment Bankers in Local Bond Elections.

To Give Is to Get: The Promotional Role of Investment Bankers in Local Bond Elections.
The American Review of Public Administration 45(5): 503-524

Todd Ely and Thad Calabrese
09/01/2015

Public managers and elected officials are generally restricted from supporting election campaigns with public resources. In the case of legislative referenda, the public stakeholders responsible for putting a policy question on the ballot must play a neutral role when acting in their official capacity. A system where private money supports public goals has emerged as regulatory provisions simultaneously restrict direct private giving to elected officials and public support for election campaigns. Using campaign finance disclosures, election results, and municipal bond issuance data, we find that post-election fees paid to firms making political contributions are significantly higher than for non-contributors. The finding improves the understanding of how private dollars support public policy outcomes, raises questions about the circumvention of laws restricting the use of public resources in election campaigns, and informs ongoing consideration of the need for additional regulatory action and disclosure requirements to address issue committee campaign contributions. 

Obamacare, five years after the law (French)

Obamacare, five years after the law (French)
Les Tribunes de la santé; (47): 81-89.

Rodwin, VG.
07/24/2015

Obamacare is the most important reform in the American healthcare system since 1965. Its introduction provoked unprecedented controversy between republicans and democrats. Whilst much remains to be done, it has already helped extend health insurance coverage, change the way the healthcare system is funded, establish federal regulations for private insurance, and above all, promote innovation and experiments to modernize the healthcare delivery. Seen from France, it is interesting to follow the array of ongoing experiments in the United States intended to modernize the healthcare system: adaptations to the payment systems for hospitals and doctors and organizational innovations to improve healthcare delivery.

Mass Administration Reorganization, Media Attention and the Paradox of Information

Mass Administration Reorganization, Media Attention and the Paradox of Information
Bertelli, Anthony M. and Sinclair, John Andrew, Mass Administrative Reorganization, Media Attention, and the Paradox of Information (May 16, 2015). Public Administration Review, Forthcoming; NYU Wagner Research Paper No. 2607110. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607110

Anthony M. Bertelli, John Andrew Sinclair
05/28/2015

How does media attention influence government decisions about whether to terminate independent administrative agencies? We argue that an agency’s salience with partisan audiences has a direct effect, but a high media profile can disrupt normal government monitoring processes and obfuscate termination decisions. We evaluate our argument in the context of a recent mass administrative reorganization by the British coalition government using probit and heteroscedastic probit regression models. Evidence suggests that termination is less likely for agencies salient in newspapers popular with the government’s core supporters, but not those read by its minority coalition partner. We also find that agencies with greater overall newspaper salience as well as younger agencies have a higher error variance.

Media Attention and the Demise of Agency Independence: Evidence from a Mass Administrative Reorganization in Britain

Media Attention and the Demise of Agency Independence: Evidence from a Mass Administrative Reorganization in Britain
Bertelli, Anthony M. and Sinclair, John Andrew and Lee, Haram, Media Attention and the Demise of Agency Independence: Evidence from a Mass Administrative Reorganization in Britain (May 16, 2015). Public Administration, Forthcoming; NYU Wagner Research Paper No. 2607087. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607087

J. Andrew Sinclair, Anthony M. Bertelli, Haram Lee
05/28/2015

When administrative agencies are terminated, do they quietly fade from public view? On the one hand, the terminated agencies may have weak issue networks and agency reputations allowing them to lose public salience. On the other hand, strong issue networks and agency reputations may mean that termination increases attention to the agencies, making the government pay the cost of public attention generated by the actors within the issue networks. We assess these competing claims by using a unique dataset from a recent mass reorganization of independent agencies in Britain as well as data capturing media attention to agencies in major national newspapers. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the agencies subject to termination experience reductions in the number of media coverage in major newspapers, disappearing from public view during the post-decision reform period.

Where have all the reinventors gone? How government reform will shape the 2016 election

Where have all the reinventors gone? How government reform will shape the 2016 election
Governance Studies at Brookings

Paul C. Light
04/24/2015

The 2016 presidential election will likely feature two tough questions about government reform, writes Paul C. Light. First, should the next president cut federal programs to reduce the power of government, or maintain existing programs to deal with important problems? Second, should the next president winnow the federal agenda to a smaller set of priorities, or accept the current priorities and focus on reducing federal inefficiency?

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