The Political Economy of Public Sector Governance

The Political Economy of Public Sector Governance
Cambridge University Press, March 2012. ISBN 9780521736640.

Anthony Michael Bertelli

This book provides a general, nontechnical introduction to core ideas in positive political theory as they apply to public management and policy. Anthony Michael Bertelli helps readers understand public-sector governance arrangements and their implications for public management practice policy outcomes. By offering a framework that applies to specific administrative tasks, The Political Economy of Public Sector Governance allows readers to think clearly about many aspects of the modern administrative state and how they fit into a larger project of governance.

Group Cohesion without Group Mobilization: The Case of Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals

Group Cohesion without Group Mobilization: The Case of Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals
British Journal of Political Science

Egan, Patrick J.

Group identities that are chosen, rather than inherited, are often associated with cohesive political attitudes and behaviours. Conventional wisdom holds that this distinctiveness is generated by mobilization through processes such as intra-group contact and acculturation. This article identifies another mechanism that can explain cohesiveness: selection. The characteristics that predict whether an individual selects a group identity may themselves determine political attitudes, and thus may account substantially for the political cohesion of those who share the identity. This mechanism is illustrated with analyses of the causes and consequences of the acquisition of lesbian, gay or bisexual identity. Seldom shared by parents and offspring, gay identity provides a rare opportunity to cleanly identify the selection process and its implications for political cohesion.

The Pragmatic Politics of Regulatory Enforcement

The Pragmatic Politics of Regulatory Enforcement
Handbook on the Politics of Regulation, edited by David Levi-Faur, London: Edward Elgar Publishers

Coslovsky, S., Pires, R. & Silbey, S.

This chapter describes regulatory enforcement as an intrinsically political endeavor. We argue that regulatory enforcement, as enacted daily by front-line
enforcers around the world, consists of the production of local agreements and arrangements that realign interests, reshape conflicts, and redistribute the risks, costs, and benefits of doing business and complying with the law. We argue that, through their transactions, both the regulators and the regulated reshape both their interests and the environment in which they operate, reconstructing their perceptions of and preferences for compliance. We call this phenomenon the “sub-politics of regulatory enforcement,” and claim that it provides a springboard for a pragmatic approach to better regulation

Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress

Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress
American Journal of Political Science, 56: 341–354. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00559.x

Clinton, J. D., Bertelli, A., Grose, C. R., Lewis, D. E. and Nixon, D. C.

Government agencies service interest groups, advocate policies, provide advice to elected officials, and create and implement public policy. Scholars have advanced theories to explain the role of agencies in American politics, but efforts to test these theories are hampered by the inability to systematically measure agency preferences. We present a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual bureaucrats and agencies that are directly comparable with those of other political actors. These estimates produce insights into the nature of the bureaucratic state and provide traction on a host of questions about American politics. We discuss what these estimates reveal about the political environment of bureaucracy and their potential for testing theories of political institutions. We demonstrate their utility by testing key propositions from Gailmard and Patty's (2007) influential model of political control and endogenous expertise development.

Civic Duty and Turnout in Japan and South Korea

Civic Duty and Turnout in Japan and South Korea
Korean Election Studies 1(2): 45-68.

Achen, Christopher H. and Aram Hur

Democratic governments rely on participation by all citizens for balanced and equitable election outcomes. What maintains voter turnout, this central aspect of democratic health? Civic duty is a powerful force in getting citizens to the polls, and yet it has often been misunderstood or neglected in empirical studies. By contrast, political theory has developed a rich literature on the obligations of democratic citizens. We show that a new statistical model based on political theorists’ analysis ofduty substantially improves the understanding of turnout in Japan and South Korea.


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