

Integrative Leadership for U.S. Security in the 21st Century

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U.S. policy makers have wrought a partially successful, partially failed transformation of national and domestic security systems in the last decade. One source of this transformation was the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the wake of 9/11. The department is an unprecedented effort to bring together a multitude of agencies with disparate missions, from disaster recovery to law enforcement, in order to ensure better information flows, quicker and more coordinated responses, as well as prevention and preparedness for domestic security crises. Additionally, Congress mandated reform of the intelligence community in 2004 in order to ensure that the various agencies (e.g., the FBI, CIA, U.S. Northern Command, local police departments) charged with gathering and integrating intelligence outside and within the U.S. were able to cooperate effectively. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, meanwhile, have also had transformational effects – partly because of their impact on the federal budget (\$4 trillion spent over the last decade, representing a doubling of the annual level of defense spending). The invasion of Iraq also rested on a very significant alteration of foreign policy doctrine, as the Bush administration broke with tradition to argue on behalf of pre-emptive warfare.

The successes or positive outcomes of this transformation are significant. Policy makers realized the need for coordinating multiple systems of gathering information about security threats and for responding to them. As a result, they invested in new systems for linking communications and information technology across agency and jurisdictional lines. A massive new airport passenger screening system was created

and has undergone a series of improvements; it has functioned reasonably well despite passenger grumblings, charges of discriminatory screenings, and the occasional report of failed scrutiny. Meanwhile virtually every American, from citizen to President, has become more aware of terrorist threats.

These qualified successes, however, have been offset by failures or negative outcomes. The coordination of multiple security systems, especially through DHS, has been problematic. For example, protection against terrorist, especially bioterrorist, attacks on ground and sea transportation systems is extremely inadequate. Approximately 1% of cargo entering US ports is inspected (Fry-Pierce and Lenze, 2011, p. 11). Malicious hackers (be they terrorists, pranksters, thieves or spies) pose serious threats to the computer systems that control financial systems, utilities, and other vital infrastructure (Rockefeller and Chertoff, 2011). The nation's electrical grid is quite vulnerable to national disasters and human error (Amin, 2008).

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) office established to integrate intelligence gathering and analysis has never been given adequate power to break down barriers among the agencies the DNI oversees (Harknett and Stever, 2011; Farrell, 2011). While the intelligence system has thwarted terrorist plotters, it also has had some conspicuous failures, such as the "underwear bomber" who got through airport security systems in December 2009 despite plenty of warning signals picked up by some intelligence operatives.

The loss of life and treasure resulting from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is staggering: about 6,800 US lives have been lost in combat and the total cost of waging and recovering from the wars is estimated at \$4-6 trillion (Bilmes, 2013). Though US

combat troops have now left Iraq and the Afghan war is winding down, the hope that the two countries ultimately will be able on their own to sustain a functioning democracy and avoid violent internal conflicts seems fleeting. The Bush administration's fierce defense of torture, the lack of trials for detainees in Guantanamo Bay under both the Bush and Obama administrations, and the recent reliance on drones to go after militants in Pakistan and elsewhere have undermined the U.S. commitment to international standards for treatment of prisoners and avoidance of civilian casualties. Meanwhile, expenditures on the two wars have contributed to the high national debt afflicting the U.S. economy. At the personal level, citizens are far more vulnerable (compared to pre-9/11) to government intrusion into their affairs and even to detention without trial. Prized civil liberties like habeas corpus, protections against government wiretapping, and the right to trial by jury have all been eroded. Even citizen access to public spaces – like the national Capitol – has been diminished.

In short, some gains have been made, but U.S. security seems fragile and citizens' civil liberties and prosperity are suffering. The country needs a way out of this dire situation. Meeting the urgent and massive challenge of renewing U.S. prosperity, guaranteeing liberties, and attaining adequate levels of security will not be accomplished, however, simply by appealing to national policy makers to focus less on partisan agendas and more on the need for new laws, budgeting practices, and administrative rules. Nor will liberties be adequately protected if citizens merely hope that judges will restore protections that have been eroded over the last decade. Renewing U.S. prosperity, guaranteeing liberties, and attaining adequate levels of security require concerted effort by all sectors of U.S. society – business, government, nonprofits, media, and

communities. A key component of such an effort will be integrative leadership – the work of integrating people, resources and organizations into semi-permanent arrangements to tackle complex public problems and achieve the common good (Crosby and Bryson, 2005).

This chapter will suggest how integrative leaders might reframe security policy and institute sustainable policies and practices that produce prosperity, guard civil liberties, and promote a secure nation. The focus will be on practices that these leaders can foster in order to garner stakeholder support, understand particular problems (such as the vulnerability of the nation’s electricity grids) more fully, and develop and implement sustainable solutions to those problems.

The next section will briefly discuss integrative leadership as a set of practices for tackling complex public issues like security and economic prosperity. Then I will suggest how integrative leaders from multiple sectors might work together, first of all to convene a national conversation on “Security, Prosperity, and Freedom” and later to develop an on-going network or coalition that would undertake public education about paths to true security in a post 9/11 world. The coalition would also foster new laws (such as the National Prosperity and Security Act [Porter and Mykleby, 2011]), new international regimes (such as the expanded Aarhus Convention recommended by Brookings analyst Ann Florini [2005]), policies, and programs designed to achieve true security (while recognizing that absolute security is never possible to a world subject to natural and man-made disasters).

Integrative Leadership

At its core, integrative leadership is cross-boundary work. Integrative leaders work across sectoral, cultural, geographic, and other boundaries to help diverse groups identify shared purposes and find mutually acceptable solutions to complex, shared problems (Crosby and Bryson, 2010). As noted above they help integrate people, organizations and resources into semi-permanent arrangements (such as coalitions, associations, and networks) that have as their mission the creation of a new social or policy regime that will have significant benefits for society as a whole. Research, sponsored by the University of Minnesota's Center for Integrative Leadership indicates that integrative leaders achieve integration at multiple levels: individual, group, organizational and societal. At the individual level, they integrate personal traits, intelligence, values and other assets (Martin, 2009; Crosby and Kiedrowski, 2009). At the group level, they connect people with diverse skills, views and backgrounds to help the group be more than the sum of its members. At the organizational level, they connect groups across functional, authority, and geographic boundaries. At the community or society level, they bridge sectors, industries, cultures, regions, and even countries.

Crosby and Bryson (2010) have developed an integrative leadership framework based on research with other colleagues into cross-sector collaborations aimed at tackling complex public problems (see Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2006; Bryson, Crosby, Stone and Saunoi-Sandgren, 2011). The framework has been used to generate and test propositions about what contributes to or undermines effective cross-sector collaboration. An underlying assumption is that sustainable solutions to complex public problems will draw on the characteristic strengths of the different key sectors – business, government,

nonprofits, communities, and the media – while overcoming their characteristic failures (Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Bryson and Crosby, 2008). Our research indicates that leaders increase their ability to foster successful cross-sector collaborations through wise attention to initial conditions, collaborative processes and structures, contingencies and constraints, and outcomes and accountabilities. We have derived a set of propositions (Table 1) and identified practices that can help leaders focus their attention systematically on these elements over extended periods of time. Table 2 shows the integrative leadership practices associated with each element.

Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here

The next section will suggest how integrative leaders might carry out these practices as they attempt to help citizens and policy makers redefine what security policy is all about and create policies, programs, rules and norms that are enacted by diverse groups, communities, and sectors, and provide optimal security in an interdependent, shared-power world.

Integrating Security, Prosperity and Freedom

Who might be the integrative leaders who undertake the challenging task of linking U.S. security, prosperity and freedom? The practices described in this section can be undertaken by government officials, civic leaders, businessmen and women, nonprofit managers, board members, members of grassroots groups, philanthropists, lay leaders of religious congregations, public artists, and many others. The place to start is a focus on initial conditions, that is, the context for launching and sustaining an effective cross-sector collaboration. The second practice focus is establishing and sustaining mutually reinforcing collaborative processes and structures, and the third is ensuring the

collaboration produces beneficial tangible and intangible outcomes. Each of these focus areas and associated practices will be discussed in turn.

Diagnosing context and laying the groundwork for collaboration

Integrative leaders can diagnose the context and lay the groundwork for collaboration via the following practices: shaping and taking advantage of windows of opportunity, building strategic cross-boundary relationships, and deploying personal and organizational assets on behalf of policy change. A window of opportunity for policy change exists when at least some stakeholders perceive a problem that needs solving, some potential solutions exist, and the political environment is favorable (Kingdon, 2003). So leaders consider what elements of the context indicate that the time is right to build a constituency for change and what elements may keep a window of opportunity from fully developing. They consider which relevant cross-boundary relationships exist or need to be built in order to help shape and take advantage of a window of opportunity and they identify which assets they and others can bring to the potential collaboration.

Practice: Shaping and taking advantage of a window of opportunity. How might those who want to launch a campaign to re-think U.S. security characterize the potential for developing a window of opportunity for their efforts? The U.S. at this point is a war-weary, recession-torn democracy. Citizen disaffection from government abounds; confidence in leaders is at low ebb. On average, citizens have very little confidence in Congressional leadership, and slightly more confidence in the leadership of the federal executive branch, state government, and business. They have the most regard for leadership of the military, closely followed by the medical sector and nonprofits and charities (Rosenthal, 2012).

Citizens see economic power shifting toward other countries, especially India and China; we worry about statistics showing our country lagging behind other “developed” nations in educational and health outcomes. Within the country, many citizens are outraged by the growing inequality between the wealthy and everyone else, a situation stated memorably in the popular “We’re the 99%” slogan of the Occupy Wall Street movement.

Yet the possibility of shaping or taking advantage of a window of opportunity also exists. The time is propitious for “planning for the peace,” in an era where terrorist threats persist within and without the country and when the global arsenals of conventional and nuclear weapons are immense. U.S. combat troops have been fully withdrawn from Iraq; the War in Afghanistan is winding down. The need to reduce the federal deficit, caused by the recession and officials’ resistance to tax increases, supports cuts in military spending (although the supporters of particular weapons programs and military bases already have been lobbying hard to resist such cuts). Citizens are uneasy and unhappy about Edward Snowden’s revelations of the extent to which the National Security Agency has tracked their email and telephone conversations.

Some policy makers and analysts are starting to suggest new directions for security policy. The Obama administration refused to be the main military force in the international intervention in Libya and has been extremely cautious about intervening in Syria’s civil war. Journalists report on the shortcomings of nongovernment contractors responsible for vital security functions, from vetting security clearances to management of the nuclear stockpile.

In April 2011, the Woodrow Wilson Center held a discussion of the need for a new national security narrative as part of its National Conversation series. Two top U.S. military analysts, Marine Col. Mark Mykleby and Navy Captain Wayne Porter, contributed to that conversation by developing a strategy paper that argues convincingly that the nation's security lies not with military dominance and a focus on threats but with a strong economy; investments in infrastructure (energy, education, social services); effective international development aid and diplomacy; and sustainable farming and energy systems. They argue that U.S. security policy is still too much influenced by the Cold War strategy of containment in an era when the U.S. must deal with a very different threat and opportunity environment. They characterize that environment as a strategic global ecology, including such trends as

the decline of rural economies, joblessness, the dramatic increase in urbanization, an increasing demand for energy, migration of populations and shifting demographics, the rise of grey and black markets, the phenomenon of extremism and anti-modernism, the effects of global climate change, the spread of pandemics and lack of access to adequate health services, and an increasing dependency on cyber networks (Porter and Mykleby, p. 8).

Several organizations have already presented credible ideas for reducing military expenditures. See, for example, the Institute for Policy Studies' report *America Is Not Broke* (Anderson and Cavanagh, 2011) or "Spending Less, Spending Smarter: Recommendations for National Security Savings FY 2012 to FY 2021," produced by the Project on Government Oversight and Taxpayers for Common Sense (2011).

Over the last 20 years, the U.S. also has developed a computer-enabled infrastructure that can serve as the vehicle for widespread citizen engagement with this challenge. Examples of successful efforts in engaging citizens in solving public problems (Gastil and Levine, 2005; Leighninger, 2011; Leighninger and Mann, 2011) abound. For

example, the nonprofit organization *AmericaSpeaks* has a 15-year history of helping citizens tackle public issues in computer-assisted Town Hall meetings. Successful citizen engagement efforts have mainly been focused on local issues, but the Obama administration, through its Open Government initiative is using the Internet and social media to elicit employee and citizen ideas and views on proposed regulations as well as making more information available about government initiatives (White House, 2011). John Kamensky (2010) cites two security-related examples: “[C]itizens were invited to provide insights for the Department of Homeland Security’s quadrennial review and to interact with people from other countries in framing priorities for U.S. foreign aid.” As a result of the administration’s commitment to “radical transparency,” massive amounts of government data are now publicly available on the Data.Gov. website. Elsewhere, especially Brazil and India, far more ambitious citizen engagement projects are underway.

While citizens are disillusioned with the national government and its leaders, they are organizing or joining movements to affect government actions. The Tea Party is perhaps the most successful example, while Occupy Wall Street and its offspring have attracted a mixed bag of protestors against public policies that favor the rich.

Practice: Building strategic cross-boundary relationships. Successful cross-boundary collaborations build on pre-existing cross-boundary relationships and thrive through building more such relationships (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006; Senge et al., 2008; Bryson, Crosby, Stone, and Saunoi-Sandgren, 2011; Ernst & Chrobot-Madon, 2011; and Mandell and Keast, 2011). Thus leaders who seek to launch a national campaign to transform security policy should identify the relationships they have across the relevant

boundaries and start building new ones. For example, many people who organize or study citizen engagement projects are already connected through the Deliberative Democracy Consortium; they have attended national meetings together and they stay informed about each other's activities through the consortium's communications. Yet these leaders may not be very well connected to government or academic experts on security and the economy; they may not have the ties to business groups that would facilitate business people's participation in a national conversation linking prosperity and security. Leaders of civic engagement groups might find they also need to strengthen ties to people who advocate for civil liberties.

One tool for identifying the relationships that should be cultivated in an effort to tackle a public problem is stakeholder analysis. An initial small group of people who hope to transform U.S. security policy would begin the analysis by asking: Which individuals, groups, and organizations are affected by the connected problems of inadequate security, a struggling economy, and threats to civil liberties, or have resources needed to resolve them? Of course, the temptation is simply to reply, "Everybody," and, indeed, the average citizen should be listed as a stakeholder in these problems. A helpful tactic for generating additional stakeholders is to concentrate on one of these interdependent, complicated problems at a time. Thus, the group could begin by focusing on stakeholders in security policy, and they might identify military contractors, the National Security Council, for-profit security firms, hackers, police departments, the Defense Department, the CIA, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, members of Congress with a strong interest or influential role in national security, think tanks, academics and others who study security policy, journalists who cover security issues,

and many others. After doing a similar exercise for stakeholders in economic policy and civil liberties, the group would also consider other stakeholders – such as *AmericaSpeaks*, the League of Women Voters, Public Agenda, various foundations, and possibly the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street – who have resources that are needed to tackle these problems. From there, the group could identify relationships they already have with particular stakeholders and which they will need to forge. Of course, existing relationships may offer avenues for reaching additional stakeholders. The practice of convening inclusive forums, to be discussed below under establishing and sustaining collaborative processes and structures, will include attention to cross-boundary relation building.

Practice: Deploying personal assets on behalf of a policy change. In addition to identifying and shaping a window of opportunity plus building strategic cross-boundary relationships, leaders hoping to initiate significant change must draw on a variety of personal resources, including formal authority, in order to prompt others to take the effort seriously and to contribute their own resources to the effort. Two types of leaders – *sponsors* and *champions* – are especially crucial. Sponsors are people who can use formal authority to legitimize the change effort and contribute staff, financial and other resources, and supportive policies. Champions draw mostly on informal authority to supply the energy, persistence, and understanding of process and change dynamics needed to keep diverse groups of people working together on a tough challenge. They also cultivate sponsors and make sure their support is continuous.

Possible organizational sponsors of a campaign to link security, prosperity and civil liberties are the National Issues Forum Institute (associated with the Kettering

Foundation), League of Women Voters, and *AmericaSpeaks*. The President or Vice President of the United States would be an influential sponsor, though one with a partisan tinge. Perhaps a bipartisan congressional group could fill the role. Possible champions could come from one of the organizations already named or similar ones, such as E-Democracy.org. Another might be Aneesh Chopra, former chief technology officer in the Obama administration.

Establishing and sustaining mutually reinforcing collaborative processes and structures

In order to launch and sustain effective collaborative projects, integrative leaders bring diverse stakeholders together to engage in processes that help them express their own views of the problem at hand, develop a shared understanding of the problem and agree on solutions or at least a plan of action. In order to sustain the collaboration, these processes must produce a governance structure for the endeavor, and that structure should be flexible enough to adapt as the collaboration evolves. The practices associated with linking collaborative processes and structures are: design and use of forums, design and use of governance and decision-making processes, influencing and authorizing decision makers, enforcing and reinforcing formal and informal rules in courts, and maintaining structural flexibility.

Practice: Design and use of forums. A forum is any face-to-face or virtual meeting in which individuals express their ideas and listen to what others have to say about a topic. In order to lay the groundwork for collaboration, integrative leaders seek to create forums that are boundary-spanning experiences involving boundary-spanning groups producing boundary objects. They engage in inclusive convening – that is, bringing diverse

stakeholders together in forums, helping them get to know each other and find personal common ground, then harvesting their views of the problem at hand as well as potential solutions. They help forum participants develop an initial agreement to work together – in effect, to become a boundary group – and continue to help participants develop further agreements over time. These agreements are boundary objects – that is, physical or conceptual objects that enable people to understand other perspectives. Boundary objects facilitate the transformation of diverse views into shared knowledge and understanding (Feldman, Khademian, Ingram, and Schneider, 2006).

An initial forum to explore the possibility of a “Security, Prosperity, and Freedom” campaign might be convened by *AmericaSpeaks*. Participants might include representatives from the League of Women Voters, the National Issues Foundation, and E-Democracy.org, and schools and think tanks focusing on security, the economy or civil liberties (for example, the Kennedy School at Harvard University, the Humphrey School at the University of Minnesota, Cato Institute, Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, Public Agenda, Taxpayers for Common Sense, and the Institute for Policy Studies). Alternatively or concurrently, local league chapters might seek partners from academia, business groups, nonprofits committed to good government, and possibly the Occupy and Tea Party movements. These local groups could link to or foment the initial national-level forum.

A possible agenda for the national forum would be:

- Review the context to thoroughly understand the window of opportunity that favors a campaign to transform national security policy

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- Outline an initial plan for a 100-day national conversation on “Security, Prosperity, and Freedom” in 2015
- Identify resources for the conversation
- Agree on next steps

The initial plan should include a governance structure for the initiative and ideas for linking the conversation to actual policy decisions. For example, the forum participants might agree to constitute themselves as a coordinating or steering committee and commit themselves to involving policy makers in the conversation and to being open to a campaign that would publicize the conversation’s results and put pressure on Congress and the President, as well as state and local officials.

The idea of a 100-day conversation resonates with an approach advocated by Rapid Results Institute (<http://www.rapidresults.org/>), which focuses on obtaining significant social and economic gains through 100-day campaigns that lead to “sustainable impact in 24 months.” The 100-day period also was tried successfully by the organizers of the Commission to End Homelessness in Minneapolis and Hennepin County (the most populous county in Minnesota). The organizers promised the commission members (who included heavily scheduled elected officials, clergy, and other professionals, as well as people experiencing homelessness) that they would be able to complete their work in 100 days. A 100-day limit gives people a little over three months to accomplish something significant. It is roughly the duration of a college semester and assures participants that they will have time to get to know each other, develop a shared understanding of a challenge, and develop an action plan, without being engaged in a never-ending process.

The call for a national conversation on security, prosperity and freedom certainly would be ambitious, and probably could only work as a loosely coordinated effort that combines national forums with largely autonomous local efforts that take advantage of existing infrastructure, such as community forums, interfaith gatherings, and social media sites (including those focused on the Occupy movement). The ambitiousness of the effort, matching the urgency of altering national policies may well inspire more people to join the conversation. As Lukensmeyer (2010) has argued, when policy makers need to make tough decisions, they are unlikely to do so without a strong public constituency for those decisions, and public engagement efforts are a promising way to develop such a constituency.

Methods for fostering inclusive and productive conversation. The steering committee for the national conversation on security, prosperity and freedom might develop a short handbook that would describe methods for ensuring that national and local forums engaged in the conversation would be inclusive and productive. Six key methods are stakeholder analysis, hosting, dialog and deliberation, systems thinking, framing and reframing, and story-telling.

Stakeholder analysis is helpful in identifying desired participants, assessing their power and interest, and choosing the best ways of involving them (Bryson, Cunningham, and Lokkesmoe, 2002). Hosting refers to means of welcoming all participants through, for example, offering food, providing interpretation services, and inviting participants to tell personal stories. Dialog requires that participants talk about what matters to them and that they listen to each other in the spirit of inquiry rather than rushing to judgment. A facilitator can help the group set ground rules and agree on ways to ensure that all are

heard and no one dominates airtime. Deliberation builds on dialog to arrive at group judgments – for example, a facilitator might help the group to agree on a set of criteria that will be used to judge the attractiveness of various solutions that were offered during the dialog process (Crosby and Bryson, 2005).

Systems thinking prompts forum organizers to have some way of involving all parts of a policy system in the conversation – in this case, everyone from defense contractors to taxpayers and possibly even security analysts and advocacy groups from outside the U.S. Systems thinking also can reveal the forces that undergird an existing policy arrangement and thus offer ideas for altering the forces. Senge et al. (2008) recommend undertaking the “iceberg exercise,” in which participants begin by talking about observable events (the tip of the iceberg) connected to the problem or challenge that concerns them. They then move below the surface to observe underlying patterns and trends, then even deeper to identify forces that cause the patterns, and finally, at the deepest level, to explore mental models that allow the problem to persist (p.174).

Another method of developing a systems view of a vexing problem is to engage in action-oriented strategy mapping (Bryson, Ackermann, Eden, and Finn, 2005). The process begins with a question: What should we do about X? In the case of flawed security policy, different forums might focus on different questions about security strategy. Some might focus on the general question: How do we think more comprehensively about security? Others might have a more specific question such as: How do we improve the balance between liberty and state surveillance and detention of citizens?

Becoming aware of mental models or ways of framing a policy problem and developing more accurate, comprehensive or innovative models and frames are difficult undertakings, but methods like the iceberg exercise and action-oriented strategy mapping can help. Forum facilitators also can help groups listen for the frames that are explicit or implicit in the way that participants talk about security. When participants are asked to talk about what makes the U.S. secure do they mainly focus on weapons systems, military training, and detection and punishment of terrorists – a military defense frame? Or do they talk about first-rate education, a full-employment economy, skilled diplomats, reputation for innovation, and investment in international education and development – a global competition frame? (In an actual discussion, more frames are likely to emerge; I offer these as contrasting examples.) The slogan “Security, Prosperity and Freedom” implies a comprehensive frame in which security is linked to and has equal status with economic prosperity and protection of civil liberties. The mental model behind the slogan would show how investments in education, infrastructure, and jobs, as well as strengthening civil liberties would contribute to national security and vice versa. (Indeed, the nation has compelling historical examples in which national lawmakers made the link between security and investments in education, domestic transportation, and the like. Consider the National Defense Education Act of 1958, in which Congress authorized massive funding to improve education in science, math and foreign languages, in large part as a reaction to the fear that the U.S. was falling behind the Soviet Union in math and science achievements (Graham, 1976). Another example is the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956, which created the country’s interstate highway system.

As part of the reframing of security, forum organizers might note that liberty and security are central, but competing values in a democracy (Stone, 2002). Of necessity they will exist in tension, though they can be complementary. Indeed, the preamble to the U.S. Constitution cites the “common defence,” “domestic tranquility,” and “the Blessings of Liberty” as three of the six reasons for forming a national government. Clearly, citizens need protection from lawlessness, from invasion, from terrorism in order to be free. At the same time, government can and does threaten the very liberties it is intended to protect when it cites security concerns to tap phone lines or email communication, or to detain citizens, without due process.

The Porter and Mykleby paper cited earlier might be a helpful resource. They argue for seeing security as “sustainment” rather than containment, in which security is based on “credible influence” rather than control. As Anne Marie Slaughter notes in the preface to the paper, they argue for focusing “first and foremost on investing our resources domestically in those national resources that can be sustained, such as our youth and our natural resources (ranging from crops, livestock, and potable water to sources of energy and materials for industry)” (Porter and Mykleby, 2011, p. 3). They believe that security is rooted in engagement and competition, and requires much less emphasis on defense and deterrence and much more on diplomacy and investment in U.S. young people, ideas and products.

Essentially, Porter and Mykleby are telling a story about the U.S. and indeed their paper is titled “A National Strategic Narrative.” Other stories are likely to emerge from a national conversation on security, prosperity and freedom. They might be stories of failure to achieve the aspirations embodied in the country’s founding documents. They

might highlight the nation's potential as a global citizen that fully abides by international treaties and leads the way on new ones. Leaders may be able to integrate these stories into a visionary narrative that offers more hope than despair; that highlights the distinctiveness of the U.S.; draws on historical examples of resiliency; emphasizes core values of security, freedom and equity; and outlines ways that citizens and policy makers alike can engage in a concerted effort to make the U.S. a shining example of a nation that protects its own people while contributing to development and peace building around the world.

Next steps. Drawing on the exercises and deliberations during the 100-day conversation, participants can emerge with plans of action and a vision that can guide an ongoing "Security, Prosperity and Freedom" campaign that includes numerous local to national initiatives. Leaders' attention at this point must shift to two types of decision-making arenas – structures that can govern the campaign and structures for general policy making.

Practice: Wise design and use of governance structures (arenas) and decision-making processes. Leaders who are attempting to sustain a collaboration throughout a campaign to alter policies and practices should help participants focus on the needed governance structures for the collaboration as well as on the arenas in which key desired policies will be considered, altered, and ideally adopted and implemented. Research on collaborations indicates that collaboration governance structures can take several forms, but they should be inclusive – that is, they should provide ways for key stakeholders to participate in setting policies for the collaboration, overseeing the action plan, and assessing outcomes (Bryson, Crosby, Stone, and Saunoi-Sandgren, 2011). Participants in planning forums

should, as part of their agenda, generate ideas for an ongoing governance structure. For example, an initial coordinating or steering committee could become a formal governing group, or a lead organization could be designated or created to oversee the collaboration. If the committee idea is chosen, it might be expanded at this point to include additional key stakeholders. If the lead organization is chosen, it can use structures such as working groups to make sure that all stakeholders continue to have ways to contribute their ideas and energies for carrying out the collaboration's agenda.

The collaboration's governance structure should be flexible enough to adapt to environmental changes and they should be linked to relevant policy-making arenas (ibid.). One way to accomplish this linkage is to include some policy makers in a permanent steering committee or in working groups. Another is informal meetings between key policy makers and steering committee members, or people who are staffing the collaborative effort. In the case of a national Security, Freedom and Prosperity campaign, organizers might decide to form a semi-permanent national steering committee and encourage formation of state and local steering committees. The national committee could set up a system for collecting and disseminating information about the campaign at all levels, as well as provide direction for the national-level agenda – for example, by leading the effort to pass major legislation.

Practice: Influencing and authorizing decision makers. The action plan emerging from the planning forums for a “Security, Prosperity and Freedom” campaign is likely to include many initiatives that will require approval by legislative bodies; elected executives such as the President and governors; as well as national, state, and local public administrators. Some may be fairly straightforward, others like the Mykleby and Porter's

“National Security and Prosperity Act” would require a lengthy bill drafting and hearing process. If constitutional amendments are proposed – for example, an amendment to limit financing of political campaigns or to require citizens to vote – the process would be even more protracted.

This practice includes lobbying, bargaining and negotiating, as well as building and sustaining substantial coalitions that can support and pressure policy makers who can provide needed policies and funding. The groundwork for coalition building would be laid in the forums that planned the “Security, Prosperity, and Freedom” campaign. The multiple stakeholders that participated in these conversations would be likely coalition members. As particular initiatives emerge from the planning process, integrative leaders may see opportunities for adding new members of the coalition based on attributes of the initiative. For example, if a constitutional amendment to limit campaign finance were included in the campaign’s action plan, an array of groups concerned about campaign finance would be likely recruits. Some participants in the national conversation on transforming security policy may decide that they want to develop a slate of political candidates that can run on a platform of security, prosperity and freedom; since a nonpartisan Security, Prosperity and Freedom campaign would be more likely to appeal to policy makers from multiple political parties, the leaders backing political candidates should be expected to form a separate coalition for that effort.

Navigating the policy change process. In order to help coalition members influence decisions in executive, legislative and administrative arenas, integrative leaders should think systematically about the policy change process. The process can be thought of as a cycle (Figure 1) encompassing several phases: initial agreement, problem definition,

search for solutions, policy or plan formulation, review and adoption, implementation and evaluation, and continuation, modification or termination (Crosby and Bryson, 2005).

Let's consider how integrative leaders might help their constituents navigate these phases as they seek to put together parts of a National Prosperity and Security Act. In the *initial agreement* phase, leaders work with diverse stakeholders to develop a series of agreements around the significance of a public problem, the promise that it can be remedied, commitments to explore remedies, and desired outputs. If ideas for a National Prosperity and Security Act were included in the action plan emerging from the national conversation on security, prosperity and freedom, the initial agreement phase for the act would already be underway. Let's assume that the action plan envisioned an act that would include massive new investments in youth education and job training, veteran employment, health care, research and development, infrastructure, along with a leaner military. Leaders of a working group focused on the act would probably want to develop subgroups or task forces to tackle different parts. For example, a subgroup might take on early childhood education, another might take on "smart" electrical grids, another might tackle re-use of military bases. Each subgroup, in turn, is likely to recruit additional participants and will need to forge its own initial agreement. They also might assess the window of opportunity for doing something about this particular component of the Security, Prosperity and Freedom campaign. (They might also consider whether an omnibus National Prosperity and Security Act with many titles is the best form for this legislation. Perhaps the group would decide it is too unwieldy and opt for several inter-related acts, such as the National Security Education Act, the National Security Energy Act, etc.)

In the *problem definition* phase, members of the subgroups would do additional research to better understand their particular problem. Take a subgroup focused on problems with the national electrical grid, for example. In the initial agreement phase group members ideally would have conducted a stakeholder analysis in which they identified key stakeholders in the grid and made sure that they had a plan for involving them in the policy change process. In this phase, possibly with some additional members, the group would dive further into the causes of the problem: Why is the national electrical grid so susceptible to breakdowns? Why is it quite vulnerable to a military or terrorist attack? Why hasn't it been upgraded to be better able to handle renewable energy sources like wind turbines?

The good news is that considerable research has already been done on these questions (see Amin & Schewe, 2007; Amin, 2008), so the group would simply need to compile and synthesize the work of others. The group also would consider what steps already have been taken to strengthen the grid. For example, the Obama administration has published a policy framework for a “21st century grid” and its economic recovery program has included smart grid investments, such as a loan program to assist in “smart grid technology deployment” in rural America (National Science and Technology Council, 2011; Chopra, 2011). The policy envisions several measures for protecting the grid from cyber attacks (The White House, 2011).

Additionally, the group would consider the ways that different stakeholders are framing the vulnerability and limitations of the grid – for some, this is a security problem, for some it's an environmental problem, for others it's an energy conservation problem and for others it's a consumer protection problem. This analysis can help the group develop a comprehensive framing of the problem that helps multiple stakeholders

understand the urgency of responding to the problem and the likelihood that tackling the problem can result in a better future for them. The group also could create a power versus interest 2x2 table, in which one axis represents a stakeholder's degree of interest (from high to low) in the problem and the other axis the stakeholder's degree of power (from high to low) associated with the problem (Crosby and Bryson, 2005, p. 121). Placing stakeholders in the table's quadrants based on their degree of power and degree of interest could prompt the group, among other things, to think through strategies for working with the most interested and powerful players to achieve results that benefit those who are less powerful, but also deeply affected by (or interested in) the problem.

In the *search for solutions* phase, the group would consider what's already being tried, how well those solutions are working, and what more should be done. They should cast their net wide for possible solutions, including those solutions being considered or implemented by other countries. In order to decide which solutions are most promising, they should develop a criteria scorecard (Crosby and Bryson, 2005, p. 259) – that is, they should develop a set of criteria for judging solutions and then rate the solutions against the criteria. Ideally the criteria will include attention to the technical and administrative feasibility of the solution, its morality and legality, and its political viability. During this phase the group also should craft and implement strategies for developing as wide as possible public awareness of the electrical grid's vulnerability and shortcomings, along with the promise for creating a strong 21st century grid.

In the *plan or proposal formulation phase*, the group would strive to formulate a plan that incorporates the most promising solutions, and outlines needed steps by different levels of government, businesses, nonprofits, citizens, and the media. Again, the

group might be able to incorporate elements of previously developed plans. Building on the plan, the group could develop specific proposals – for example, focusing on the the National Security and Prosperity Act, the group could develop a detailed proposal for including federal research and infrastructure funding for upgrading the electricity grid in the act. They should give careful attention to crafting a proposal to which members of Congress are likely to say yes, and to do that, they should identify members who are likely to play key roles in considering the legislation and deciding its fate. They will need to be knowledgeable about past congressional reaction to renewing the grid. Since the support of the Obama administration will be crucial in winning over Congress, the proposal also should be crafted in keeping with the President’s policy framework for a 20th century grid. In this time of concern about the federal deficit, the group would be wise to undertake careful cost-benefit analysis and include only solutions that show a substantial payoff for money invested. The proposal should include attention to implementation of envisioned new policies and programs. Other characteristics of a winning proposal are noted in Crosby and Bryson (2005, pp. 272-274).

As part of this phase, the group should invite key stakeholders to review drafts of the proposal and when feasible incorporate modifications that can guarantee their support. As the group looks ahead to the review and adoption phase, it should assess whether it has a large enough coalition to persuade policy makers that approving the proposal is a good idea. If a larger coalition is desirable, the group should invest further in winning the support of additional stakeholders, including citizens.

In the *review and adoption phase*, the group should seek to create a “bandwagon effect” for its proposal. The members would play up the strengths of the proposal,

highlight the magnitude of support for it, and seek favorable coverage or response in social media, print and broadcast media. They might create You Tube videos that would play up the vulnerability of the grid and evoke the hope of a more secure future. Satire that pokes fun at opponents of the proposal and stimulates citizens' competitive juices might be an effective ingredient. (See the You Tube video "We're Number 37," created during the debate on the 2010 Affordable Care Act

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVgOl3cETb4>.)

Group members also should continually cultivate relationships with members of Congress and staff who control the agendas of relevant committees and they should pay attention to the procedures for considering, amending, and voting on the proposal. They should keep supportive policy makers and staff supplied with research data, public opinion surveys, and moral and practical arguments in order to help these busy people make the case for the proposal. Of course, the group should keep its supportive coalition informed and actively engaged throughout this phase, while keeping an eye on opponents. Paying attention to implementers will be especially important in this phase in order to make sure that any changes in the proposal will be implementable and that implementers have adequate resources and guidance.

If the modified proposal is passed as part of a National Security and Prosperity Act or on its own (say, as the National Defense Electricity Supply Act), the *implementation and evaluation phase* would get underway. In this phase, the group will face several challenges: the possibility that rulemaking and bureaucratic procedures will create barriers to rapid and effective implementation, the tendency of coalitions to diminish once their proposal has been adopted, and the possibility that those who object

to the new policies and programs will challenge all or part of them in court. Thus, group members will want to monitor the rulemaking process, continue to nurture relationships with implementers, keep coalition members involved, and prepare to respond to court challenges. (Of course, the group should have made every effort in earlier stages to ensure that the new policies and programs would not invite such challenges.)

The group also should support an evaluation system that assesses progress toward goals at different implementation stages, reports on tangible and intangible outcomes, and provides ample opportunities for learning in order to improve the new programs being implemented. Additional aspects of evaluation will be discussed below in connection with the practice of assessing outcomes and managing results.

At some point after a policy change has been fully implemented, it enters the continuation, modification, or termination phase. For example, legislation authorizing the upgrading of the electrical grid might set up a five-year timeline for expending all authorized funds. As the end of that period approaches, group members should assess whether the program should be renewed with little alteration, whether it should be significantly modified to respond to changed conditions, or whether enough progress has been made (or the program is so flawed or unsupportable) that the program should be terminated. The group should look carefully at data about the program's effectiveness in dealing with the problem that prompted its creation. If significant changes are required in order to help the program improve its effectiveness or deal with new problems, the group may need once again to convene forums to develop wider understanding of the need for reform and to begin the process of developing proposals for new legislative, executive, or administrative policies. If a program is no longer needed or sustainable, the group may be

wise simply to let it wind down. Assuming the program had successes, the group may wish to celebrate those and honor the people who contributed to success.

Practice: Enforcing and reinforcing formal and informal rules and norms in courts.

Rules – and especially norms – are crucial mechanisms for ensuring effective communication, coordination, and collaboration. Enforcing and reinforcing rules and norms is the work of formal and informal courts. As noted above, leaders of a Security, Prosperity and Freedom campaign should ensure that any policies or programs they succeed in establishing will pass muster in formal courts. They also would be wise to focus on building enough public support for desired new behaviors, such as energy conservation, that the “court of public opinion” will enforce norms – for example, approbation for driving electric cars and disapproval of gas guzzlers.

Additionally, leaders of a collaboration should think about ways of enforcing the collaboration’s agreements about its policies and operations. Often, the only mechanism is peer pressure, a court of public opinion that is internal to the collaboration. A governing group and staff may also have the ability to distribute funds or other resources to partners, and that control over resources may also help enforce rules and norms.

Practice: Maintaining structural flexibility. In the course of a major collaborative initiative, partners experience multiple shocks and shifts in the environment. If they are to sustain the collaboration, they must use flexible structures and processes to respond to and even shape these changes. The foci of practices associated with maintaining structural flexibility are working within both hierarchies and networks and forming and maintaining boundary groups. One such practice is navigating hierarchical and network structures. The Security, Prosperity and Freedom campaign as envisioned here would be

a network of participating organizations, groups and individuals. The steering committee would provide loose coordination and direction, but would not have the ability to control what participants do. The organizations themselves would have varying degrees of hierarchy that would affect their ability to make decisions about how to participate in the campaign. Thus integrative leaders within the campaign should keep in mind the power of decision makers within hierarchies, such as federal government agencies, as well as the power of people (and organizations) in central positions within networks (that is, people and organizations with the ability to influence many other members of the networks).

Ensuring creation of tangible and intangible outcomes

Leaders seeking to develop effective cross-sector collaborations must have means of assessing outcomes and feeding assessment data back to people carrying out the collaboration's activities so they can make adequate midcourse corrections. These assessments can hold particular people or organizations accountable through the practices associated with design and use of courts.

Practice: Assessing outcomes and managing results. Partners in the Security, Prosperity and Freedom campaign can attempt to ensure that programs established as a result of the campaign have good evaluation measures in place and that results are transparent. They might build on the experience with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The Obama administration established a system for tracking the \$300-plus billion appropriated via the act and has made extensive information about expenditures and results available through the Recovery.gov website. The website also offers users several ways to report suspected fraud, waste and abuse. The result is that this complex program

has been one with an extremely good track record in avoiding waste and corruption (DeSeve, 2011).

Conclusion

A window of opportunity exists for transforming U.S. security policy in ways that align with citizens' interest in economic recovery, protection against domestic and international threats, and guarantees of civil liberties. This paper has outlined key practices for integrative leaders who seek to take advantage of this opportunity by bringing people together across cultural, geographic, and sector boundaries to explore the strengths and weaknesses of current U.S. security regimes and to champion beneficial change. The paper has suggested how these leaders might organize a 100-day national conversation on "Security, Prosperity and Freedom," resulting in an extended campaign to alter national, state and local security policies and practices. To help these leaders think systematically about the policy change process, the chapter has presented the policy change cycle, illustrated by efforts to create a 21st century national electrical grid.

Clearly, security policy is a complex and complicated challenge for a democracy; it is often dominated by technical experts, industrial lobbyists, military insiders, and veteran lawmakers. Still, this policy area also includes many other informed stakeholders – from independent analysts, to academics, to think tank researchers, to nonmilitary government employees, to nonprofit advocacy groups, to public engagement organizations. If the U.S. is to have security policies that allow the country to flourish and to be a leading global citizen, these stakeholders must develop a stronger capacity to broaden the conversation about the purposes and impacts of security systems and develop

clear, supportable proposals for alternative policies. Integrative leaders are unlikely to find a higher calling than building this capacity.

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Table 1. Propositions about Formation and Maintenance of Cross-Sector Collaborations Bryson, Crosby, Stone and Saunoi-Sandgren, 2011
Address Initial Conditions
<p>Proposition 1: Similar to all inter-organizational relationships, cross-sector collaborations are more likely to form in turbulent environments. In particular, the formation and sustainability of cross-sector collaborations will be affected by driving and constraining forces in their competitive and institutional environments, including political forces and the availability of relevant technology.</p>
<p>Proposition 2: Public policy makers are most likely to try cross-sector collaboration if they believe that separate efforts by several sectors to address a public problem have failed, or are likely to fail, and the actual failures cannot be fixed by a separate sector alone; or less dramatically, that no sector can address the presenting problem effectively on its own.</p>
<p>Proposition 3: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when one or more linking mechanisms, such as powerful sponsors, general agreement on the problem, existing networks, neutral conveners, or RFPs, plans, projects or technologies requiring collaboration are in place at the time of their initial formation.</p>
Design Effective Processes
<p>Proposition 4: The form and content of a collaboration’s initial agreements, as well as the processes used to formulate them, will affect the outcomes of the collaboration’s work. A sequence of increasingly operational agreements involving key decision makers, a certain degree of flexibility, and re-negotiability are likely to be important elements of the agreement process.</p>
<p>Proposition 5: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed if they have committed, able sponsors and effective, persistent champions at many levels who provide formal and informal leadership.</p>
<p>Proposition 6: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed if they establish with both internal and external stakeholders the legitimacy of collaboration as a necessary form of organizing, as a separate entity, and as a source of trusted interaction among members.</p>
<p>Proposition 7: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed if a continuing virtuous circle of trust-building activities (including nurturing of cross-sectoral and cross-cultural understanding) can be established and maintained.</p>
<p>Proposition 8: Because conflict is common in partnerships, cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed if partners use resources and tactics to help equalize power and manage conflict, particularly in the early phases of planning and organizing the work to be done.</p>

<p>Proposition 9: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed if they use a combination of deliberate and emergent planning, with deliberate planning emphasized more in mandated collaborations and emergent planning emphasized more in non-mandated collaborations. At some point, however, emergent planning needs to be followed by formalization; too much emergent planning can undermine collaboration success.</p>
<p>Proposition 10: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed if their planning makes use of stakeholder analyses, emphasizes responsiveness to key stakeholders, uses the process to build trust and the capacity to manage conflict, and builds on the competencies and distinctive competencies of the collaborators.</p>
<p>Proposition 11: Inclusive processes are needed to produce inclusive structures that in turn foster inclusive practices. All other things being equal, both inclusive processes and structures facilitate effective collaboration (another virtuous circle).</p>
<p>Create Effective Structural and Governance Arrangements</p>
<p>Proposition 12: Collaborative structure is influenced by environmental factors, such as system stability and the collaboration’s strategic purpose; structures must be able to handle changes in the environment and strategic purpose.</p>
<p>Proposition 13: Collaborative structure is also likely to change over time due to ambiguity of membership and complexity in local environments.</p>
<p>Proposition 14: Collaboration structure and the nature of the tasks to be performed at various levels, including the client or street level, are likely to influence a collaboration’s overall effectiveness; a measure of structural ambidexterity is likely to be necessary to manage the array of tasks.</p>
<p>Proposition 15: Governing arrangements, including those that operate at both informal and formal levels, must be able to respond effectively to strategic, operational, and mixed issues, and the extent to which they do is likely to influence collaboration effectiveness. This responsiveness is needed in part to decide who gets to decide and to be able to manage spatial and temporal ambidexterity.</p>
<p>Manage Contingencies and Constraints Affecting Process and Structure</p>
<p>Proposition 16: Collaborations that are prepared to take advantage of a window of opportunity are far more likely to succeed than those that are not.</p>
<p>Proposition 17: In order to be effective, collaborations must manage the many roles of technology as a facilitator of collaboration, and as a non-human actor capable of providing solutions, affecting policies and politics, altering public perceptions, and stimulating internal organizational changes.</p>

<p>Proposition 18: Collaborations involving system-level planning activities are likely to involve the most negotiation, followed by collaborations focused on administrative-level partnerships, followed by service delivery partnerships.</p>
<p>Proposition 19: Needed competencies must be available or developed, or cross-sector collaboration goals will not be achieved.</p>
<p>Proposition 20: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed if the collaborations build in resources and tactics for dealing with power imbalances and shocks. Shocks need to be expected and can be positive, e.g., a window of opportunity.</p>
<p>Proposition 21: Competing institutional logics are likely within cross-sector collaborations and may significantly influence the extent to which collaborations can agree on essential elements of process and structure as well as outcomes. Competing logics must be managed effectively.</p>
<p>Assess Outcomes and Manage Accountabilities</p>
<p>Proposition 22: Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value if they build on individuals' and organizations' self-interests along each sector's characteristic strengths, while finding ways to minimize, overcome, or compensate for each sector's characteristic weaknesses.</p>
<p>Proposition 23: Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value if they produce positive first-, second-, and third-order effects far in excess of negative effects.</p>
<p>Proposition 24: Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value if they are long-lived, resilient, and engage in regular reassessments.</p>
<p>Proposition 25: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to be successful if they have an accountability system in place that tracks inputs, processes, and outcomes; use a variety of methods for gathering, interpreting, and using data; and have in place a results management system built on strong relationships with key political and professional constituencies.</p>
<p>Proposition 26: The normal expectation ought to be that success will be very difficult to achieve in cross-sector collaborations.</p>

Table 2. Integrative Leadership Practices

Framework elements	Practice Focus	Leadership practices
Initial conditions	Diagnosing context	Shaping and taking

		<p>advantage of windows of opportunity</p> <p>Building strategic cross-boundary relationships</p> <p>Deploying personal and organizational assets on behalf of policy change</p>
Process and structure	Establishing and sustaining mutually reinforcing collaborative processes and structures	<p>Design and use of forums</p> <p>Design and use of governance structures and decision-making processes</p> <p>Influencing and authorizing decision makers</p> <p>Enforcing and reinforcing formal and informal rules and norms in courts</p> <p>Maintaining structural flexibility</p>
Outcomes and accountabilities	Ensuring the collaboration produces beneficial tangible and intangible outcomes	Assessing outcomes and managing results