Associated Professor of Public Service, NYU Wagner; Associate Professor, NYU Gallatin
Prof. Chiteji is an economist whose areas of interest include monetary economics, macroeconomic policy, family economics, the distribution of household wealth, retirement saving and pensions. Her policy experience includes work at the U.S. Congressional Budget Office and membership in the National Academy of Social Insurance. Her research has been published in several scholarly journals, such as Labour Economics, the Journal of Family Issues, the Journal of International Development, and the American Economic Review's Papers and Proceedings. Prof. Chiteji earned her Ph.D in economics from the University of North Carolina. She is an associated faculty member of the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service.
This course teaches the principles of macroeconomic policy in an international setting. The course focuses on developing a framework for understanding the forces that determine output, employment, inflation, interest rates, exchange rates, the trade deficit, and other key macroeconomic variables. This framework is used to evaluate different macroeconomic policies in the context of different national economic environments.
By the end of the course, students will understand: (1) How an open macroeconomy functions, and why there are business cycles. (2) The role of the Federal Reserve and other central banks, and the challenges they face in designing and implementing good monetary policy. (3) The impacts of fiscal policy choices such as government budget deficits and large levels of public debt.
When confronted with the economic costs of addressing a serious health problem, many American households do not possess the ability to deal with the crises on their own and may turn to family members for help. Using longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we examine if the level of wealth held by individuals is related to the health problems of their siblings. We find evidence that having a sibling who has experienced a health problem decreases the amount of wealth that some families have. The research has implications for the existing literatures on altruism and kin networks, as it sheds some light on the nature of altruism that prevails in U.S. families and on how kinship networks matter. Because of its focus on the consequences of health problems, the research also has implications for public policy discussions about the health care system and social insurance more generally.
Why do estimates of the intergenerational persistence in earnings vary so much for the United States? Recent research suggests that lifecycle bias may be a major factor [Grawe, N., Lifecycle bias in estimates of intergenerational earnings persistence. Labour Economics 2006, 13:551–570; Haider, S., and Solon, G., Life-cycle variation in the association between current and lifetime earnings. American Economic Review 2006, 96(4):1308–1320.]. In this paper we estimate the intergenerational correlation in lifetime earnings by using sons' and fathers' earnings at similar ages in order to account for lifecycle bias. Our estimate based on earnings measured at 35–44 for both fathers and sons is similar to that for the age range 45–54.
A wide range of economic and health behaviors are influenced by individuals’ attitudes toward the future—including investments in human capital, health capital and financial capital. Intergenerational correlations in such behaviors suggest an important role the family may play in transmitting time preferences to children. This article presents a model of parental investment in future-oriented capital, where parents shape their children’s time preference rates. The research identifies a dual role for a parent’s time preference rate in the process of shaping the offspring’s attitude toward the future, and discusses paths through which parents may socialize children to be patient. The model’s implications are studied by investigating the parent–child correlation in pension participation using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
No abstract available.
Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) are a popular form of informal finance in developing countries. This paper examines the rosca's ability to enforce its terms of membership and the implications that this has for their existence in an economy. A connection between enforcement costs and the desirability of rosca formation is illustrated using a framework that focuses on the nature of the financial contract that the rosca offers, allowing inferences to be drawn about the likely viability of roscas throughout the development process and the implications this has for debates about financial dualism. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.