Work Requirements and Child Tax Benefits

Jacob Goldin, Tatiana Homonoff, Neel Lal, Ithai Lurie, Katherine Michelmore, and Matthew Unrath
NBER Working Paper, w32343. Revise and Resubmit at Review of Economics and Statistics.

Many U.S. safety-net programs condition benefit eligibility on work. Eliminating work requirements would better target benefits to the neediest families but would also attenuate pro-work incentives. We study how expanding child tax credits to non-workers affects maternal labor supply, using administrative tax records and variation in state credit eligibility from quasi-random birth-timing. We employ a novel method for using placebo analyses to maximize the precision of our regression discontinuity estimator. Eliminating work requirements causes very few mothers to exit the labor force; our 95% confidence intervals exclude reductions over one-third of one percent.

Wagner Faculty